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Beth A+ Simmons, Frank Dobbin,
and Geoffrey Garrett
Abstract Political scientists, sociologists, and economists have all sought to ana-
lyze the spread of economic and political liberalism across countries in recent decades+
This article documents this diffusion of liberal policies and politics and proposes
four distinct theories to explain how the prior choices of some countries and inter-
national actors affect the subsequent behavior of others: coercion, competition, learn-
ing, and emulation+ These theories are explored empirically in the symposium articles
that follow+ The goal of the symposium is to bring quite different and often isolated
schools of thought into contact and communication with one another, and to deﬁne
common metrics by which we can judge the utility of the contending approaches to
diffusion across different policy domains+
The worldwide spread of economic and political liberalism was the deﬁning
feature of the late twentieth century+ Free-market-oriented economic reforms—
macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization of foreign economic policies, privat-
ization, and deregulation—took root in many parts of the world+ At more or less
the same time, a “third wave” of democratization and liberal constitutionalism
washed over much of the globe+ Most economists believe the gains to developing
countries from the liberalization of economic policies to be in the hundreds of
billions of dollars+ But they also acknowledge the instability and human insecurity
sometimes left in liberalization’s wake+1 Political scientists argue that the rise of
democracy has contributed to the betterment of both human rights and inter-
national security+2 While the precise effects of these twin waves of liberalization
are still debated, it is hard to deny that they have had a tremendous impact on the
For helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article, the authors wish to thank Barry Eichen-
green, Lisa Martin, and John Meyer+ Nancy Brune and Alexander Noonan provided excellent research
assistance+ The authors also wish to acknowledge and thank the Yale Center for International and Area
Studies, the UCLA International Institute, and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Har-
vard University for funding conferences at which this collection of symposium papers were discussed+
1+ See Dobson and Hufbauer 2001; Kaplinsky 2001; and Prasad et al+ 2003+
2+ Doyle 1986+
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© 2006 by The IO Foundation+ DOI: 10+10170S0020818306060267contemporary world+ But we are interested in a prior question: why has much of
the world come to accept markets and democracy?
Some commentators focus on the exercise of American power+ According to
this line of argument, the hegemonic United States—often acting through the
Bretton Woods international economic institutions it helped create after World
War II—has used a combination of carrots ~political and military support, as well
as preferential access to U+S+ markets! and sticks ~from strings attached to ﬁnan-
cial assistance to threats of military coercion! to impose its vision for political and
economic liberalism on the rest of the world+ Others see the decentralized process
of technologically induced globalization at work+ Sharp declines in the ability of
governments to control cross-border movements of goods, services, and capital
are thought to have forced countries to compete with each other for investment
and market share by enacting political and economic reforms that reduce govern-
mental constraints on ﬁnance and ﬁrms+ Still another line of argument focuses
more on the emergence of inﬂuential ideologies, from monetarism to glasnost, which
may have little to do with political power or market dynamics+
This symposium puts these processes under the analytic microscope+ We are
interested primarily in how a given country’s policy choices are affected by the
prior choices of other countries, sometimes mediated by international organiza-
tions and private transnational actors+ There is considerable variation in the spread
of liberal policies across time and space, which the contributors to this sympo-
sium exploit to explore the processes underpinning liberalization+ Our principal
objective is to shed light on the causal mechanisms that explain the timing and
geographic reach of liberal innovations+ What has caused these new policies to
diffuse across time and space?
The contending approaches to liberalization we outline share the assumption
that national policy choices are interdependent—that governments adopt new pol-
icies not in isolation but in response to what their counterparts in other countries
are doing+ In this introduction, we review four distinct mechanisms through which
interdependent decision making may take place—coercion, competition, learning,
and emulation+ We begin by describing the patterns of liberalization that we seek
to explain+ We then move on to distinguish interdependent decision making by
national governments from the null hypothesis of independent decision making,
which has been for decades the workhorse approach in comparative and inter-
national political economy+ We then elaborate the four classes of diffusion hypoth-
eses found in the literature, which are subsequently tested alongside one another
and developed in the other articles in this symposium+ We end by previewing the
ﬁndings of the coming articles+
The Spread of Economic and Political Liberalism
We deﬁne liberalism conventionally+ Economic liberalism, in the classic rather than
the American sense, refers to policies that reduce government constraints on eco-
782 International Organizationnomic behavior and thereby promote economic exchange: “marketization+” Polit-
ical liberalism refers to policies that reduce government constraints on political
behavior, promote free political exchange, and establish rights to political partici-
pation: “democratization+”
There is no doubt that both forces have been powerful facets of the global polit-
ical economy in recent decades+ Figure 1 documents this trend on three key indi-
cators of liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s+ The privatization of state-owned
enterprises went from an iconoclastic policy idea in Margaret Thatcher’s 1979 Brit-
ish election manifesto to a major element of economic policy in both developed
and developing countries over the course of twenty years+3 At more or less the
same time, there was a dramatic opening of national economies to external forces—
exempliﬁed by substantial reductions in policy restrictions on cross-border capital
ﬂows+4
But the scope of liberalization was not limited to economic policy+ Perhaps the
headline political statistic of the late twentieth century was that the proportion of
democratic countries in the world more than doubled between 1980 and 2000,
from under 30 percent to almost 60 percent ~while the number of sovereign states
in the world also doubled to roughly 200!+5
Moreover, all three curves in Figure 1 follow the classic S-shaped logistic curve
associated with the diffusion of innovation, beginning with hesitant early moves
to liberalize in only a few countries, followed by a rapid escalation in the trend,
and ﬁnally a leveling off+ In less than a generation, a new equilibrium level of
liberalism appears to have been established in each realm+
3+ Brune et al+ 2004+
4+ Simmons and Elkins 2004+
5+ Przeworski et al+ 2000+
FIGURE 1. Political and economic liberalization around the world
The International Diffusion of Liberalism 783Figure 2 demonstrates that in addition to this broad trend toward political and
economic liberalism, there was considerable convergence in national trajectories+6
Cross-national variation, deﬁned in terms of coefﬁcients of variation ~the standard
deviation of each distribution divided by its mean!, declined substantially in each
of the three areas of privatization ~representing domestic economic liberalization!,
capital account openness ~external economic liberalization! and democracy ~polit-
ical liberalization!+
It is important to note, however, that these broad global trends toward liberal-
ism belie substantial variations in the paths pursued by countries in different parts
of the world+ Figures 3 to 5 break down the global averages presented in Figure 1
by geographic region+ As students of democracy know well, there have been three
waves of democratization in recent decades ~see Figure 3!+ Latin American coun-
tries began to democratize in the 1970s, to the point where today the region is
almost as democratic as North America and Western Europe+ The same kind of
pattern, though less pronounced, was apparent in East Asia and the Paciﬁc+ A sec-
ond wave of democratization centered around the fall of the Berlin Wall and the
subsequent velvet revolutions in the former Soviet bloc between 1989 and 1991—
but it should also be noted that the pace and extent of democratization was almost
6+ For recent reviews of the “convergence” literature, see Heichel, Pape, and Sommerer 2005; and
Knill 2005+
FIGURE 2. Variations in liberalization around the world (SD/mean)
784 International Organizationas great, and began just a few years earlier, in South Asia+ The number of democ-
racies in Sub-Saharan Africa also began to increase in 1989, though that region
still lags behind Eastern Europe and Central Asia+ The Middle East and North
Africa saw no signiﬁcant democratization in the 1980s and 1990s+
Figure 4 presents data on the openness of national economies to international
ﬁnancial ﬂows with respect to foreign direct investment ~FDI!; the buying and
selling of stocks, bonds and currencies across national borders; and international
bank lending+ The most dramatic feature of this ﬁgure is the rapid march among
the countries of North America and Western Europe toward complete ﬁnancial
openness+ The same general trend, though muted, applies in Central Europe, East
Asia, and Latin America+ There were small moves toward capital mobility in Sub-
Saharan Africa, but only in the mid- and late 1990s+ Financial policy remained
relatively closed in the Middle East and in South Asia in the 1980s and 1990s+
Finally, Figure 5 presents data on regional variations in privatization+ Given
that the data are measured in terms of the prices at which state-owned assets were
sold ~relative to gross domestic product @GDP#!, it is not surprising that these curves
are less smooth+ Nonetheless, it is clear that privatization took off earlier and was
more pronounced in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and North
America, and Western Europe than elsewhere+ The radical and thoroughgoing nature
of the velvet revolutions in the former Soviet countries is readily apparent in the
case of privatization, no doubt in large measure because these countries had the
most state-owned assets to sell in the 1990s+
FIGURE 3. Regional variations in democracy
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FIGURE 5. Regional variations in privatization
786 International OrganizationFigures 3 to 5 demonstrate that despite the global trend toward liberalism, there
were important differences in the trajectories of different parts of the world—
differences across regions, over time, and among different dimensions of liberal-
ization+ The Middle East and North Africa did not liberalize much, if any, in the
1980s and 1990s+ Latin America democratized and marketized gradually over the
whole period, whereas the shift from state socialism to capitalist democracy was
much more abrupt in Eastern Europe+
What kinds of dynamics produced these “regional effects”? Growing literatures
in political science and sociology point to different explanations for such policy
clustering, which we dub “diffusion+” We now deﬁne diffusion and distinguish it
from alternative causal forces+
Policy Diffusion—and Its Alternatives
International policy diffusion occurs when government policy decisions in a given
country are systematically conditioned by prior policy choices made in other coun-
tries ~sometimes mediated by the behavior of international organizations or even
private actors or organizations!+ Theories of diffusion have pointed to diverse mech-
anisms ranging from Bayesian learning to rational competition through hegemonic
domination to unthinking emulation of leaders+ Theories of diffusion encompass a
wide array of assumptions about who the primary actors are, what motivates their
behavior, the nature and extent of the information on which they base decisions,
and their ultimate goals+
But what theorists of diffusion explicitly reject is the notion that processes of
policy change can adequately be understood by conceiving of national govern-
ments as making decisions independently of each other+ Policy independence is
thus the null hypothesis that motivates our project+7 Most cross-national social
science research focuses on variants of this null hypothesis, developing explana-
tions based on the speciﬁc conditions governments encounter+ For example, dif-
ferences in economic development,8 social cleavages,9 national institutions,10 and
elite interactions11 have all been argued to play important roles in democratiza-
tion+ Students of the spread of democracy, and of market institutions, frequently
presume that decisions to democratize are made in isolation+
A small literature has developed that takes seriously the international diffusion
of democracy,12 but little has been done to date to fashion an integrated model or
to test competing hypotheses+ The political economy literature, perhaps more sur-
7+ Compare, for example, Lenschow, Liefferink, and Veenman 2005+
8+ Przeworski et al+ 2000+
9+ Collier 1999+
10+ Linz and Stepan 1996+
11+ O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986+
12+ See Huntington 1991; Markoff 1996; O’Loughlin et al+ 1998; and Starr 1991+
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Political economists have analyzed restrictions on cross-border capital ﬂows as
tools of economic repression13 or reasoned that such controls could be explained
by partisanship, domestic cleavages and governments’ desires for seigniorage+14
Recent work on the choice of monetary and exchange-rate institutions also focuses
on the null hypothesis, as amply demonstrated by a recent special symposium of
International Organization focusing on domestic political pressures,15 domestic
veto players,16 federalism,17 coalition governments,18 and domestic policy trans-
parency19 as determinants of national monetary institutions and policies+
In the past twenty years, an important strand of research in political economy
has linked domestic policy choice with constraints, pressures, and opportunities
generated by the international economy+ Gourevitch studied the impact of position
in the international economy on domestic responses to economic crisis+20 Rogowski
analyzed trade policy coalitions in comparative advantage terms+21 Frieden hypoth-
esized that the preferences of domestic groups vis-à-vis ﬁnancial liberalization and
exchange-rate policy were the function of their speciﬁc endowments+22 But these
studies tend to reduce “external inﬂuences” to simple exogenous factors, notably
changes in relative prices around the world+23 None explicitly explores the possi-
bility of interdependent decision making—the impact of policy choices in other
countries on the behavior of governments at home+
Frieden and Rogowski posited the simplest possible argument to explain eco-
nomic liberalization in recent decades+ They contend that “exogenous easing,” such
as declining transport and communication costs, has greatly increased the oppor-
tunity costs of closure+24 Over time, these costs have mounted on governments,
increasing the incentive to open their economies+ As Garrett and Lange were quick
to note, however, the pace and extent of liberalization have varied substantially
across countries+25 Garrett and Lange argued that it was critical to take seriously
this variation, rather than dismissing it as “noise,” as theorists of exogenous eas-
ing tended to do+ They then proposed a framework for analyzing how constella-
tions of domestic interests and institutions mediate between lower costs of
international movements and national policy liberalization+
13+ Giovannini and De Melo 1993+
14+ See Epstein and Schor 1992; Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti 1995; and Quinn and Inclán 1997+
15+ Clark 2002+
16+ Keefer and Stasavage 2002+
17+ Hallerberg 2002+





23+ Keohane and Milner 1996+
24+ Frieden and Rogowski 1996+
25+ Garrett and Lange 1995+
788 International OrganizationOur intention is not to deny that relative prices and other factors exogenous to
the decision-making environment in any one country affect policy choice+ But from
our perspective, the critical analytic point is that exogenous shocks—such as chang-
ing world prices—are a commonly experienced phenomenon to which govern-
ments must decide how to respond+ Their responses are no doubt inﬂuenced in a
“bottom-up” fashion by conditions and institutions within their countries+26 But
they are surely also affected by the decisions and behavior of other countries+ The
challenge facing theorists of international policy diffusion is to demonstrate that
domestic political and economic factors cannot alone predict when governments
adopt new policies, and to develop and test hypotheses that distinguish among the
several possible mechanisms of diffusion+ We argue that government decision mak-
ing in these critical areas has in fact been highly interdependent and that the mech-
anisms of diffusion can potentially be teased out in empirical analyses+
Mechanisms of Global Diffusion
Interdependent decision making has long informed the study of international rela-
tions and international political economy+ There is an afﬁnity between the recent
game theory revolution in the social sciences and international policy diffusion+27
But diffusion processes are characteristically uncoordinated processes,28 which can-
not easily be subsumed under the umbrella of fully informed, rational decision
making+ Indeed, the interest of the social sciences in diffusion is not only much
broader; it also long predates the inﬂuence of game theory+ Anthropologists in the
ﬁrst half of the twentieth century “laid primary stress on diffusion, that is, the
process of adopting or borrowing by one culture from another various devices,
implements, institutions, and beliefs+”29 More recently, sociologists have argued
that nations mimic their successful peers almost ritualistically+30 Economists debate
whether there is a rational0material base to international ﬁnancial crises, or whether
they result from “contagious” herd behavior+31 Political scientists have incorpo-
rated the diffusion of ideas into their accounts of the choice of economic poli-
cies+32 Students of organizational behavior model international networks among
people and ﬁrms that are said to drive the diffusion of technology and manage-
ment practices+33
26+ See, for example, Gilardi’s study of the diffusion of independent regulatory agencies ~2005!+
27+ Lake and Powell 1999+
28+ Elkins and Simmons 2005+
29+ Malinowski 1944, iii+, 17+
30+ Thomas et al+ 1987+
31+ Kaminsky and Reinhart 2000+
32+ See Hall 1989; and McNamara 1998+
33+ See Goolsbee and Klenow 1999; Keller 2002; and Powell 1990+
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stances does each operate? How can we distinguish among them, both theoreti-
cally and empirically? Next we sketch four discrete diffusion mechanisms that are
amenable to rigorous empirical testing+
Coercion
One prominent explanation for the spread of economic and political liberalism in-
volves a distinctly antiliberal mechanism: coercion+ Powerful countries can explicitly
or implicitly inﬂuence the probability that weaker nations adopt the policy they pre-
fer by manipulating the opportunities and constraints encountered by target coun-
tries, either directly or through the international and nongovernmental organizations
~NGOs! they inﬂuence+ Whether direct or mediated, this mechanism may involve
the threat or use of physical force, the manipulation of economic costs and beneﬁts,
and0oreventhemonopolizationofinformationorexpertise—allwiththeaimofinﬂu-
encing policy change in other countries+ Coercive diffusion involves power asymme-
tries that the strong exploit to impose their policy preferences on weaker countries+34
Coercion theorists begin by assuming that a powerful nation has an intentional
motive to stimulate policy change in another country or countries+ Most also assume
that weaker countries would prefer to resist were it not for the foreign inﬂuence+35
The capacity and will of the more powerful player to inﬂuence the incentives
~broadly understood! of the weaker to liberalize are key to the “hard” coercion
approach+ In the simplest form of this theory, dominant nations and their agents
directly coerce weaker nations to adopt policy changes that those weaker nations
would not otherwise have adopted+
There are many variations on this basic theme+ Dominant countries may exer-
cise power bilaterally36 or through collective entities acting as their allies or
agents+37 In some areas, private actors may play important roles in coercion+38
34+ Essentially hierarchical in nature, coercion is a form of “vertical diffusion” discussed in much
of the literature on federalism and European regionalism+ See, for example, Daley and Garand 2005;
and Gilardi 2005+
35+ This is not always easy to establish empirically, even in cases where it is broadly assumed that
governments are being coerced+ Vreeland 2003, for example, argues that governments often accept
IMF loans because they want conditions externally imposed on them, rather than the other way around+
See Drazen 2002, for a similar argument+
36+ The United States, for example, is putting signiﬁcant bilateral pressures for policy liberalization
on the would-be members of the Central American Free Trade Agreement; see Financial Times, 17
December 2003, The Americas, 2+ On the Mexico-European Union Political and Economic Associa-
tion Agreement of December 1997, which ultimately led to a free-trade agreement in March 2000, see
Sanahuja 2000+ The European Commission and the United States have demanded privatization in devel-
oping countries in exchange for further agricultural liberalization+ See “A privatisers’hit list: European
commission demands to deregulate services spell disaster for the developing world,” The Guardian
~London!, 18 April 2002+
37+ The IMF and the World Bank, along with various US government agencies, are seen as exem-
plars of coercive liberalization, through various forms of conditional lending and other assistance+ On
the “Washington consensus”, see Williamson 1993+
38+ Private banks, for example, in IMF conditionality+ See Gould 2003; and Edwards 1997+
790 International OrganizationWhile the identity of the actors may differ, their relationship is characteristically
hierarchical: the more powerful actors have access to, and potentially use, resources
to affect the incentives of others to liberalize+ Hard coercion of course has its lim-
its+ The more resistant the weaker party, the greater the incentives required and
the more serious the “enforcement” and “monitoring” costs needed to secure the
desired policy change+39
Various forms of “soft” coercion may be common in the diffusion of policy
liberalization+ The policies of powerful governments often constitute focal points
in policy coordination games with multiple equilibria+40 Dominant countries adopt
one policy approach—for example, the BaselAccord in capital market regulation—
that establishes the equilibrium in which weaker countries are expected to partici-
pate+41 Coercive intent may or may not be at work in such cases+ It is only a small
step to Gruber’s notion of “go-it-alone-power,” by which larger countries make
policy decisions that signiﬁcantly alter the status quo for others, giving the latter
little choice but to follow suit+42
Softer still, powerful countries may be closely aligned with theories, informa-
tion, or ideas that favor particular policy moves, such as liberalization+ With a sort
of Gramscian ideological hegemony, dominant actors can inﬂuence others through
ideational channels without exerting physical power or materially altering costs or
beneﬁts+ By virtue of their central positions in policy networks, more powerful
countries may be inﬂuential in the framing of policy discussions+43
How can one demonstrate that coercion ~in its harder and softer manifestations!
actually explains policy change? In order to make the case, one must identify the
coercive actors, show that these actors support the policy in question, and demon-
strate the channel through which the powerful inﬂuence policy change across bor-
ders+ If the International Monetary Fund ~IMF! is the hypothesized source of
inﬂuence ~acting as a de facto agent of the leading nations that inﬂuence the orga-
nization!, empirical tests should demonstrate that the IMF favored the policy in
question and that countries adopting the policy were particularly dependent on
IMF largesse+ Similarly, studies linking policy diffusion to soft coercion should
show that the policy ideas actively promoted by strong countries are more likely
to be put into practice in weaker countries structurally or situationally dependent
on them+
39+ See Eichengreen and Ruehl 2000; Sachs and Huizinga 1987; and Cordella and Dell’Ariccia
2002+
40+ See, generally, Schelling 1960+ Garrett and Weingast 1993 demonstrate the importance of Ger-
many as a focal point in the European Union+
41+ Simmons 2001+
42+ Gruber 2000 provides the example of Mexican liberalization in the wake of the US-Canada
Free Trade Area+
43+ Hira 1998+ Practically every international ﬁnancial institution—from the Bank for International
Settlements to the International Monetary Fund to the various regional institutions—has a research
department engaged in the dissemination of economic models favored by economists in wealthy, core
countries+ See de Vries 1997; and Polak 1997+
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Competition is a more decentralized mechanism for policy diffusion than coer-
cion+ Theorists of competition-based diffusion stress the differential attractiveness
of certain policies to investors and buyers in international markets+ Competition
arguments are typically applied to economic policies, though there is some evi-
dence that investors and even buyers in the global marketplace have preferences
for certain political systems, sometimes for liberal democracy and sometimes for
benevolent authoritarianism+44 Students of competitive diffusion elaborate the pol-
icy moves through which governments compete with each other for internation-
ally mobile capital and export-market share+ Simplifying regulatory requirements,
ameliorating investment risks, and reducing tax burdens are often viewed as pol-
icy choices that can, quite quickly, make an investment locale more attractive,
exports more competitive, and an economy more vital+ The mechanisms underly-
ing competitive diffusion are broadly the same for theorists who see competition
as a positive force promoting efﬁcient policy tools and those who see competition
producing a “race to the bottom” as countries slash taxes, social spending, and
environmental and labor regulations to win over investors and export markets+
Competitive theories of the diffusion of liberalization must stipulate why com-
petition among countries, and not just “efﬁciency” within them, drives the spread
of a particular policy+ After all, economic efﬁciency is likely to be an important
element in the decision calculus of governments+ The question is: how and why
might competition among countries elicit a particular policy change? The conven-
tional wisdom is that in the absence of competition, governments often prefer exten-
sive market regulation and large public economies, which can help them to achieve
economic stability, pursue social purposes such as the redistribution of wealth and
risk, and collect rents+ As long as competing jurisdictions have similar levels of
regulation and public investment, the thinking goes, those controlling mobile fac-
tors of production can choose along locations on these dimensions+ This is how a
high regulation equilibrium can be sustained+
The high regulation equilibrium may be destabilized, however, once a govern-
ment from a competing jurisdiction breaks ranks and begins to liberalize, regard-
less of the reason+ When a country’s policy choice gives it an edge in attracting
foreign investment or in selling to export markets, competitors will have strong
incentives to give up policy tools they favor on political or social grounds and
follow suit—for fear of large-scale losses of investment and jobs+ This of course
happens whether the new policy actually creates favorable circumstances, or whether
investors and global buyers merely believe that it creates favorable circumstances+
Competition theorists share some important assumptions+ First, they assume that
the policy under examination has the potential to affect the ﬂow of international
production and capital or the attractiveness of a nation’s exports+ Absent this
44+ See Jensen 2003; and Meyer 1998+
792 International Organizationassumption, there would be no reason to respond to the policies of another gov-
ernment; nothing tangible would be at stake+
Second, they assume that the policies that diffuse have consequential effects in
the short- to medium term+ The longer it takes for a speciﬁc policy to affect inter-
national business activity, the less likely a government will be to give up a favored
policy tool+ Governments, after all, do not have inﬁnite time horizons+
Third, competitive models assume an information-rich ~in fact, close to perfect!
environment+ Competitive models of diffusion assume that it is possible for gov-
ernments ~and analysts! to determine which countries compete with each other, in
which markets, and how intense the competition is+ Governments are also assumed
to know how policy changes in other countries will affect the global economic
landscape and how this will in turn affect welfare in their own countries+ Diffu-
sion by competition is expected to increase the more intense the economic com-
petition between countries and the more a given policy instrument is expected to
inﬂuence that competition+
Finally, whereas coercion theorists assume that the most important relation-
ships in diffusion processes are vertical, competition theorists assume that the most
important relationships are horizontal+ The policies of one’s economic equals are
more important than the policies of the economic powers+ Policy liberalization
should spread most readily among units that are similar on important competitive
dimensions, among the Davids and among the Goliaths but not necessarily from
the Goliaths to the Davids of the world+
That jurisdictions compete in their formulation of economic policies is hardly a
new insight+ This dynamic has been documented extensively at the subnational
level,45 with respect to a wide range of phenomena ranging from tax concessions
to the introduction of lotteries+46 Competitive models are increasingly employed
in studies of regional integration, for example in the context of the European
Union+47 Several inﬂuential studies argue that competition for mobile capital has
driven macroeconomic “convergence” around the neoliberal ideal, ﬁrst in the Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development ~OECD! and then in the
developing world as well, due to competition among countries for increasingly
mobile capital and ﬁrms—reducing social programs48 and shifting the tax burden
from capital to labor+49
Unfortunately, however, most studies of global competition do not test the theory
directly but assume that indicators of “openness” sufﬁce to capture the pressures
45+ See Cai and Treisman 2004; and Gray 1994+
46+ See Berry and Berry 1990; Brueckner 2000; and Peterson and Rom 1990+
47+ See, for example, Sinn and Ochel 2003+
48+ See Garrett 1998; Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Garrett 2001; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001;
and Rudra 2002+ The evidence for a race to the bottom in social spending under conditions of greater
openness in these studies is decidedly mixed+
49+ See Genschel 2002; Rodrik 1997; and Oates 2001+ After a decade of careful research, however,
the empirical evidence on whether international market exposure has made taxes more regressive remains
inconclusive+ See Baldwin and Krugman 2004; Garrett and Mitchell 2001; and Swank 1992 and 1998+
The International Diffusion of Liberalism 793governments experience to alter their ﬁscal or social policies+50 A more precise
test of the competition hypothesis involves linking liberalization in country A to
the policies of A’s competitors in the world economy+51 There is no particular rea-
son to believe that A’s level of exposure to world markets per se is responsible for
policy liberalization or deregulation, especially if few other countries with whom
A competes have themselves done so+
Competition models should specify as precisely as possible the areas in which
governments can be expected to be sensitive to the policies of their peers+ Export-
ers, for example, are likely to be most inﬂuenced by policy changes in other coun-
tries that affect input costs, such as wages+ A policy that reduces labor costs in a
competitor country should lead domestic exporters to lobby their government for
an “equal playing ﬁeld+” Foreign direct investors are sensitive to a range of trans-
action costs ﬂowing from the political risks and contractual hazards inherent in
operating a ﬁrm in a foreign jurisdiction+52 Policies that reduce these transaction
costs in nations that compete for foreign investments should stimulate similar inno-
vation at home+53 Foreign portfolio investors are especially responsive to taxes,54
inﬂationary pressures,55 and capital controls+56 These are all areas in which we
would expect diffusion by competition to be especially powerful+
Competitive diffusion should be more pronounced among countries located within
the same competitive networks+ That is, one might expect a country to be much
more inﬂuenced by the policy choices of its trading partners, countries with which
it competes for trade in third countries, and countries with similar export proﬁles,
than by the policies of countries that are not part of its commercial network+ Com-
petition for capital is harder to measure because networks may be more latent
than those revealed in trade patterns+ Competition for FDI could be a function of
the degree to which countries share the same export partners, or the extent to which
countries send the same kinds of products abroad+ The more similar two countries
are on these dimensions, the more competitive for FDI they are likely to be and
the greater the weight of country A’s policy in predicting country B’s+57 For poli-
cies expected to affect nonequity portfolio investment, countries with similar credit
ratings might be the most direct competitors+58
In sum, the empirical task facing the competition approach to international pol-
icy diffusion is twofold+ First, one must identify the network~s! of countries that
50+ See, for example, Neumayer and de Soysa’s 2006 ﬁne test of liberalization’s effect on labor
standards and practices+
51+ Spatial models measuring the “distance” between two competitors are an especially promising
way to proceed empirically+ Such spatial models are explained in a recent article by Beck, Gleditsch,
and Beardsley 2006+
52+ Henisz 2000+
53+ See Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006+
54+ Gastanaga, Nugent, and Pashamova 1998+
55+ Mosley 2003+
56+ Simmons and Elkins 2004+
57+ See, for example, Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006+
58+ Simmons and Elkins 2004+
794 International Organizationcompete in different markets+ Second, proponents must demonstrate that changes
in the policies of the members of a competitive network increase the probability
of similar changes in other countries in the network—with the pace and probabil-
ity of change an increasing function of “proximity” in the network ~measured by
similarities in trade proﬁles, per capita income, and so on!+
Learning
Learning refers to a change in beliefs or change in one’s conﬁdence in existing
beliefs, which can result from exposure to new evidence, theories, or behavioral
repertoires+59 Some researchers distinguish “simple learning,” in which new infor-
mation leads to changes in means but not ends, from more complex cognitive pro-
cesses involving new beliefs about ends as well+ In the realm of public policy,
actors may be learning at both the simple tactical level ~how to better achieve a
particular goal! and at a deeper level ~what goals they should pursue!+60 For dif-
fusion theories based on learning, the choices of others are important not because
they affect the payoffs of a policy choice ~as in both hegemonic and competitive
theories discussed above!, but rather because others’ choices generate new data
that informs beliefs about causal relationships+61
Three approaches have been useful in understanding social learning: political
science perspectives on social knowledge; Bayesian learning from economics, and
the work on channeled learning developed largely by sociologists+ In political sci-
ence, Haas’s work has drawn attention to the generation of social knowledge, or
“the sum of technical information and of theories about that information which
commands sufﬁcient consensus at a given time among interested actors to serve
as a guide to public policy designed to achieve some social goal+”62 In this approach,
policy innovation spreads in the wake of the diffusion of a shared fund of ~often
technical! knowledge among elites about what is effective+ Learning in this liter-
ature is fostered by a cluster of intersubjectively deﬁned conditions: shared norms,
beliefs, and notions of evidentiary validity+63 “Epistemic communities” are major
actors in the development of social knowledge and are especially inﬂuential in the
policymaking process+ This approach has much in common with constructivism,
which we discuss under “emulation” below+
Economists take a more objectivist and individualistic view+ They focus on the
process of Bayesian updating, in which individuals add new data to prior knowl-
59+ See the very useful review of the learning literature, especially as it has been applied to foreign
policy decision making, by Levy 1994+
60+ Philip Tetlock, for example, argues that learning can be hierarchical, but that most foreign pol-
icy learning takes place at the tactical level: political decision makers reconsider their basic strategic
assumptions and orientation only after repeated failures to generate a tactical solution+ See Levy 1994,
286+
61+ Elkins and Simmons 2005+
62+ Haas 1980, 367–68+
63+ Haas 1992+
The International Diffusion of Liberalism 795edge and beliefs to revise their behavior accordingly+ With new information, the
probable range of hypotheses that might explain those data is likely to shift and
also to narrow+ The more consistent the new data, the more likely an actor’s prob-
ability estimates of the truth of various hypotheses are to converge on a narrow
range of possibilities—and ultimately policies+ Figure 6 illustrates the basic Bayes-
ian mechanism+ The ﬂattest curve represents an actor’s initial estimate of which of
several possible relationships is true+ The wide dispersion indicates a good deal of
uncertainty, but Hypothesis D is initially viewed as most likely+ New data allow
for a revision of the probability that D is true+ In this case, the ﬁrst round of new
data causes the actor to believe that D and C are equally probable+ Another round
of observed data solidiﬁes the belief in the probability of C+ Bayesian learning has
the effect of shifting both the mean and the dispersion of beliefs about the true
nature of relationships in the world+ In Figure 6, additional information shifted
actors’ beliefs in hypothesis D toward hypothesis C+ At the same time, certainty
about this assessment solidiﬁed in the face of new information+
It is important to note, however, that nothing in the Bayesian learning mecha-
nism guarantees that actors will converge on “the truth+” The process merely
FIGURE 6. Bayesian updating
796 International Organizationdescribes the way in which new information affects actors’ probability assess-
ments+ Just as an individual can “learn” a theory in physics that is later dis-
proven, nations can take the wrong lessons from the policy experiences of others
or can learn a wrong-headed theory+ Exactly what actors learn will be inﬂuenced
by a number of factors, including the source of new information and how it is
processed+
Bayesian learning is a “rational” process in the sense that actors are assumed to
make optimal use of available information—weighting learning in terms of objec-
tive similarities among cases ~countries!, extracting the right signal from the mass
of noise, and so on+ However, the aggregation of these individual choices may not
be socially optimal+ Economists recognize that sequential social learning can be
responsible for “herd behavior,” as was evident in successive international ﬁnan-
cial crises in the 1990s+ More generally, models in which actors learn from the
decisions of a small number of leaders and suppress their private information tend
to lead to Pareto-inefﬁcient outcomes+64
One of the central issues in any learning model is how “data” are gathered and
interpreted+ Where do new data D1 and D2 in Figure 6 come from? It is obviously
impossible for any actor to collect and process all information that might bear on
a particular set of hypotheses+ Information is costly, and actors are faced with a
sampling problem+ March and Simon argued long ago that the rationality of indi-
vidual decision makers is bounded by their capacity to assemble and evaluate rel-
evant evidence of the efﬁcacy of a policy approach+65 Policymakers may use
cognitive shortcuts in which attention is drawn to highly successful countries or
to highly successful outcomes, rather than assessing all available information as
the Bayesian approach demands+ This kind of channeled learning may be facili-
tated by communication networks among actors who already are connected in other
ways+ The type of exchange of information is central to many sociological studies
of policy diffusion+66 In these models, the cognitive process is dominated by an
“availability heuristic,” in which actors unable to retrieve a full sample of infor-
mation base their decisions on only those instances that are available to them—
limiting the viable range of policy alternatives+67
Several important studies indicate the importance of learning within communi-
cations networks in the policy arena+68 Gray’s pioneering work on policy innova-
tion among the states of the United States, for example, demonstrated that the
intensity of contact among ofﬁcials was associated with policy diffusion+69 Recent
research on how developing countries formulate and implement policies ranging
64+ See Banerjee 1992; and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992+
65+ March and Simon 1993+
66+ See Coleman et al+ 1966; and Rogers 1995+
67+ See Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Gale and Kariv 2003; and Axelrod 1997+
68+ The international relations literature has recognized a role for channeled learning outside of the
policy realm+ For example, with respect to coup contagion, see Li and Thompson 1975+
69+ See Gray 1973+ See also Lutz 1987+
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points to strong social learning from neighbors+70 It is well documented in the
international literature that the process of negotiating and maintaining institu-
tional afﬁliations may create opportunities to learn and persuade+71 International
institutions are another natural conduit for learning and, especially, for organized
pedagogy+ The IMF, for example, regards its research function as a way to dissem-
inate the lessons of earlier liberalizers ~usually developed countries! to the rest of
the world ~primarily the developing countries!+72 Many other examples can be found
in the literature+73 In these cases, international organizations, either as agents or as
sets of rules that enhance transparency, appear to have had important effects on
information ﬂows and policy transmission+
How might one devise tests for the inﬂuence of learning on policy diffusion?
There are good reasons to suppose that learning has occurred when we see highly
successful policy changes in country A, followed by similar changes in countries
B and C+ That is, measurable policy success should increase the probability of
adoption elsewhere+ In the case of privatization, for example, higher rates of invest-
ment and economic growth and lower deﬁcits would suggest that the policy worked
at the national level+ Over time, the ratio of these measures among privatizers
relative to nonprivatizers should predict future privatization efforts+ It may be that
learning happens at the global level, and it may be that it happens among groups
of peers who share information and whose experiences are more relevant to each
other—among neighbors, cultural groups, or states at the same level of develop-
ment+ Similar to ﬁrms that have sunk investments in particular technologies,74 gov-
ernments may be reluctant to change course if the adjustment costs appear high
and the payoff uncertain+75 Thus, one might expect that governments will change
only in the face of strong and compelling evidence+
Learning theories suggest that information about policy success or failure abroad
will inﬂuence the probability of policy change at home+ The information may be
acquired rationally, dispassionately, and completely, as in strict Bayesian models+
It might be mediated through existing communication networks+ Information might
ﬂow more quickly among peer groups of countries whose experiences are deemed
most relevant to each other+ In all cases, however, evidence of success increases
the likelihood of adoption elsewhere+ As we discuss below, this connection to some
70+ See Brooks 2005; Khamfula 1998; and Meseguer 2004+
71+ Haas 1959+
72+ Quirk 1994+
73+ To name but a few: Eising 2002 attributes the spread of liberalization in the electricity sector in
Europe to learning facilitated by the Council of the European Union+ Nye 1987 found that inter-
national institutions reinforced learning with respect to nuclear policy through their use of rules and
standard operating procedures+ Kahler 1994 has noted that the international ﬁnancial institutions shape
learning to reinforce their policy preferences+
74+ See, for example, Atkeson and Kehoe 2001+
75+ On the likelihood of incremental change in the absence of a dramatically successful model, see
Schneider and Ingram 1988+
798 International Organizationreasonable measure of “success” becomes more tenuous as one moves away from
learning and toward diffusion processes based on emulation+76
Emulation
Sociologists have studied policy diffusion through the lens of “social construc-
tion” since the late 1970s+77 Constructivism is rooted in Weber’s insight that to
understand social action one must grasp its meaning to the actors, and that that
meaning is an empirically traceable product of social context+78 The distinguish-
ing feature of social constructivism is its focus on the intersubjectivity of meaning—
both legitimate ends and appropriate means are considered social constructs+79
According to this view, while policymakers believe that they can, should, and do
divine the “best practice” in a given policy area, in fact they cannot accurately
judge whether policy A is better than policy B with any certainty+ Instead, theory
and rhetoric often serve as the basis of decision making+ But theory and rhetoric
change over time, and as they do, social meaning is constructed and reconstructed+
Thus, the same policies can have different meanings over time+ Tariffs, for exam-
ple, were thought to do very different things in 1880, 1947, and 1995+
The “world polity” approach draws on the Weberian view of an increasingly
global culture comprising broad consensus on the set of appropriate social actors
~individuals, organizations, and nation-states have replaced clans, city-states, ﬁef-
doms!, appropriate societal goals ~economic growth and social justice have replaced
territorial conquest and eternal salvation!, and means for achieving those goals
~tariff reduction and interest rate manipulation have replaced plunder and incanta-
tion!+ Meyer suggested that a view on what is “appropriate”—in terms of actors,
goals, and policy means—has diffused from country to country around the globe,
ﬁrst in the West and then elsewhere+80 The initial empirical focus was social pol-
icies and human rights+ Meyer and colleagues showed that between 1950 and 1970
all countries expanded mass schooling—which had been deﬁned as key to achiev-
ing both growth and democracy—regardless of political ideology, political system
or level of economic development+81 They found that developing and developed
countries alike sign human rights treaties to signal their commitment to global
norms+ Global norms are strong enough to cause even countries thatAmnesty Inter-
national chides for abusing rights to sign on+82
76+ Many researchers ﬁnd that learning and emulation are not necessarily mutually exclusive+ See,
for example, Meseguer 2005+
77+ The ﬁrst sustained analysis appeared in Meyer and Hannan 1979+ For reviews of the literature,
see Strang and Meyer 1994; Dobbin 1994; Rogers 1995; and Strang and Soule 1998+
78+ Weber 1978, 4+
79+ See Hirschman 1977; Meyer et al+ 1997; and Berger and Luckmann 1966+
80+ Boli-Bennett and Meyer 1978+
81+ See Meyer et al+ 1977; and Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 1992+
82+ See Boyle and Preves 2000; Forsythe 1991; and Ramirez and McEneaney 1997+
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research in the latter 1990s+83 For proponents, understanding how public policies
become socially accepted is the key to understanding why they diffuse+ Social
acceptance of a policy approach can happen in several ways+ Powerful countries
may serve as exemplars+84 As we have already pointed out, however, it can be
difﬁcult to discern where coercion ends and emulation begins when it comes to
the inﬂuence of dominant actors+
Two other causal processes seem clearly to ﬁt into the emulation category+ First,
groups of experts ~epistemic communities, discussed above under social learning!
may become advocates for a given policy, providing seemingly disinterested and
objective analysis of its beneﬁts+ Students of epistemic communities postulate that
policy professionals, academics, international nongovernmental organizations
~INGOs!, and NGOs can inﬂuence governments to adopt new policies simply by
making arguments for them+85 Epistemic communities not only help to deﬁne new
solutions to existing problems ~for example, central bank independence as a solu-
tion to inﬂation! but also identify new problems and propose solutions to them ~for
example, global warming and the Kyoto protocols!+ The epistemic community of
American economists is often seen to have played a critical role in economic lib-
eralization in Latin America and beyond+86 It may be that Latin American coun-
tries sent economics students to the University of Chicago because they wanted, ex
ante, to join the liberal bandwagon driven by Friedman and colleagues+ This would
suggest that North American economists had an effect on Latin American eco-
nomic policies, but that their inﬂuence operated through the preferences of national
leaders who sent deputy ﬁnance ministers to train in the United States, rather than
through the preferences of newly minted Chicago School graduates themselves+
Either way, the community of economists has arguably shaped new policy norms+
Whereas conventional logic-of-development arguments suggest that countries
will adopt certain programs when they are developmentally ready for them, world
polity theorists have found that countries embrace new norms for symbolic rea-
sons, even when they cannot begin to put them into practice+ This is particularly
true of social welfare policies and human rights+ Strang and Chang, for example,
ﬁnd that large numbers of countries ratiﬁed International Labor Organization trea-
ties guaranteeing welfare rights, but that only in developed countries did ratiﬁca-
tion lead to increased welfare expenditures+ Developing countries signed the treaty
even though they lacked the resources to carry through+ This may not represent
bad faith so much as the power of new international norms even in countries that
are not developmentally capable of implementing them+87 Even in the realm of
83+ See Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Ruggie 1998; and Wendt 1999+
84+ Haveman 1993+
85+ See Haas 1959 and 1992; Mintrom 1997; and Mintrom and Vergari 1998+
86+ Numerous studies have purported to show, for example, the inﬂuence of “Chicago boys” in
economic policy change in Latin America, either directly or indirectly+ See Drake 1994; Harberger
1997; Montecinos 1997; and Murillo 2002+
87+ Strang and Chang 1993+
800 International Organizationeconomic policy, countries may adopt new global norms before they are really
ready+
The other principal emulation approach draws on reference group theory in social
psychology+ From this perspective, individuals emulate the behavior of their self-
identiﬁed peers, even when they cannot ascertain that doing so will in fact be in
their best interests+ At the international level, sociocultural linkages ~common lan-
guage, history, religion, and so on! may contribute to “psychological proximity”
among nations+88 Indeed, many cross-national analyses of diffusion ﬁnd signiﬁ-
cant effects of cultural similarities that cannot readily be explained by learning or
competition+89
A test of these constructivist arguments might begin with a look at the effect of
participation in NGOs, INGOs, professional communities, and other groups that
actively promote new policy norms+ One might also test for the effect of shared
cultural values by examining the effect of shared cultural heritage, language, and
religion, controlling for effects of competition, learning, and coercion+ The avail-
ability of good, longitudinal data on a wide range of economic, trade, political,
and other factors has made these kinds of nuanced tests of hypotheses possible in
recent years+ Net of coercion, competition, and learning, do the ideas of leading
epistemic communities or advocacy groups have effects? Some of the studies
reported in this symposium show that they do+
Four Varieties of Liberalism
The articles in this symposium explore these four diffusion mechanisms with respect
to four different classes of policy: liberalization of international economic trans-
actions ~bilateral investment treaties!, domestic economic policy liberalization ~tax
policy!, liberalization of the role of government ~public-sector downsizing!, and
political liberalization ~democratization!+ Here we provide a brief policy-by-policy
preview+
International Economic Transactions:
The Spread of Bilateral Investment Treaties
Zachary Elkins,Andrew Guzman, and Beth Simmons explore the diffusion of bilat-
eral investment treaties that seek to improve foreign investors’ legal redress in
countries where local regulatory and legal practices may appear to put foreign
investment at risk+ The article ﬁnds considerable evidence for diffusion through
competition+ Developing countries are much more likely to sign a bilateral invest-
ment treaty ~usually with a developed country! when their prime competitors for
trade and investment have done so+ Other mechanisms may also be at play+ Coer-
88+ Rose 1993+
89+ Simmons and Elkins 2004+
The International Diffusion of Liberalism 801cion is not ruled out: countries that draw on the resources of the IMF tend to be
much more likely to sign bilateral investment treaties ~BITs!, which may reﬂect a
degree of pressure to do so+ They also ﬁnd some evidence of learning from the
success of other developing country signers: in years when BITs were most strongly
associated with FDI inﬂows, other countries were more likely to sign BITs as well+
However, Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons ﬁnd no evidence of emulation through
region, common language or colonial history+ They conclude that competitive pres-
sures are likely the strongest engine of diffusion in this area+
Domestic Economic Liberalization: The Diffusion of Tax
Schemes Internationally
Why have governments increasingly implemented domestic policies that seem to
favor marketization over governmental intervention? Duane Swank examines the
diffusion of new “market-conforming” corporate tax structures in the OECD fol-
lowing the adoption of a new tax regime in the United States in 1986+ Swank
argues that competition was the major driver of diffusion because the U+S+ tax
changes were most closely followed in other developed economies with similar
political economic structures to those in America—that is, the institutions of lib-
eral ~uncoordinated! market institutions+ According to Swank, competition with
the United States for investment was the driving force of policy change among
these countries, but not among the coordinated market economies of northern
Europe+ These countries came to adopt reforms similar to those enacted by Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan because the United States is the dominant host and supplier
of capital investment throughout the developed world+ The market for FDI in coor-
dinated market economies, in contrast, operates more independently from the U+S+
and is driven by other considerations+
Liberalization of the Structure of Government: The Diffusion
of Public-Sector Downsizing
Chang Kil Lee and David Strang examine public-sector downsizing in the 1980s
and 1990s in the OECD+ As in the case of “market conforming” tax policies, there
is no evidence of coercion+ But unlike Swank, Lee and Strang do not believe that
competition was the main driver of reductions in public-sector employment+ Instead,
they focus on an interesting learning process+ In the context of the dominance of
neoliberal thinking about the efﬁcacy of downsizing, countries took strong signals
from evidence that downsizing worked to improve economic performance but heav-
ily discounted evidence showing that bigger public sectors were good for growth
~by providing collective goods such as education and infrastructure undersupplied
by markets!+ Lee and Chang thus propose a hybrid emulation and learning dynamic
in which an inﬂuential epistemic community deﬁned downsizing as a solution to
the problem of poor economic performance, which in turn catalyzed only one type
of learning—countries ignored evidence that was inconsistent with the new received
wisdom but acted on evidence that was consistent with it+
802 International OrganizationPolitical Liberalization: The International Spread
of Democracy
The ﬁnal article examines political liberalization+ Kristian Gleditsch and Michael
Ward examine the diffusion of democracy and begin with the observation that the
process of democratization has been geographically clustered+ Given that most
of the domestic correlates of democracy ~levels of income, education, and so on!
tend to change slowly, there is a strong prima facie case to be made that democ-
racy spreads by some sort of regional diffusion+ What is the nature of the diffu-
sion? Gleditsch and Ward contend that coercion is the most important driver of
this dynamic, though in a way that is quite different from the core-periphery arche-
type+ In the case of democratization, powerful prodemocracy groups in neigh-
boring countries apparently represent an effective power resource for would-be
democratizers+ Conversely, civil conﬂict in neighboring countries reduces the capac-
ity of democratizers elsewhere in the region+ Power operates here, but it is local-
ized power resources available to pro- and antidemocracy groups within nations
that matter+
Conclusion
How is it that we have come to live in such a globalized world? This is one of
the most fundamental and puzzling questions we can ask as social scientists exam-
ining political and economic policy developments over the past half-century+
How did marketization in its various guises gain a signiﬁcant foothold in a grow-
ing number of countries? How and why have the various trappings of political
liberalization—from elections to human rights—become important governing prin-
ciples in most ~though certainly not all! regions of the world?
Coercion, competition, learning, and emulation are distinct—and we think
powerful—concepts+90 Nonetheless, drawing sharp dividing lines becomes more
difﬁcult as we move into the interstices among them+ The IMF’s support for lib-
eralization can be understood as coercive when policy conditions are explicitly
attached to loans+ But it may also be the case that the ideas espoused by the Fund
and other international ﬁnancial institutions are followed not only because of asym-
metries in power but also for the kinds of reasons that constructivists focus on
with respect to emulation+ Distinctions might also be difﬁcult to draw in the abstract
between channeled learning and emulation+ After all, as learning becomes more
“boundedly” rational, it inevitably drifts closer to the kinds of processes one nor-
mally associates with emulation—taking cues from other countries with which a
given nation shares cultural, linguistic, historical or religious afﬁnities+ The authors
recognize the ambiguities that remain, despite state-of-the-art empirical testing+
90+ For a recent argument that these ~and possibly other! diffusion mechanisms can in fact all be
subsumed within a single theoretical framework, see Braun and Gilardi 2006+
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of the context of the issue area+ Taken as a whole, these articles make a signiﬁcant
contribution to understanding liberalization’s diffusion throughout much of the world
over the second half of the twentieth century+
The articles that follow provide a fascinating set of windows on the fundamen-
tal processes underlying globalization+ No one denies that the underlying pro-
cesses are complex, but our strategy in this volume is to contribute to knowledge
of a complex whole through well-deﬁned and rigorously executed studies that
engage the basic framework set out in this introduction+ This introduction is of
course only a starting point for the inquiries that follow+ Each piece adds its own
rich insights to the issue area, adapting and amending the mechanisms set out above
in appropriate and creative ways+
While each substantive article has its creative take on diffusion, all of the con-
tributing scholars have pooled their intellectual efforts by working through a fairly
consistent set of alternative mechanisms as well as testing for the “null hypoth-
esis” of independent decision making+ Swank’s article on tax liberalization covers
important domestic political and economic explanations ~the political orientation
of the government, for example! that could be independently responsible for a
more market-friendly tax policy, and controls for trade competition, as well as
other diffusion mechanisms+ The Elkins, Simmons, and Guzman article on bilat-
eral trade agreements explicitly controls for the inﬂuences of liberalization in the
region as well as liberalization trends in those states most likely to compete for
global capital+ The willingness of these authors to engage several common alter-
native hypotheses elucidates the diffusion of policies that have enhanced the global
ﬂow of capital over the past several decades+
Finally, the article on political liberalization presents strikingly complementary
ﬁndings+ Gleditsch and Ward’s work on the diffusion of democracy gives the null
hypothesis ~independent national factors! a real ﬁghting chance, taking on “social
requisites” theory+ They ﬁnd that the essentially domestic explanation is not quite
as convincing as various diffusion inﬂuences on the prospects of political liberal-
ization+ To be sure, their explanations differ greatly: Gleditsch and Ward concen-
trate on the political resources provided by democratizing neighbors+
Very few symposia address as broad a topic in as comprehensive a way as
does this collection of articles+ All of the contributions address “liberalization,”
but additional insights are gleaned by comparing marketization with democratiza-
tion+ Both may have their ideational explanations, but marketization, these studies
seem to suggest, tends also to be subject to stronger competitive factors that are
not as clearly present in explaining democratization+ It is interesting to note that
among the economic policy topics, competitive pressures can be found not only
for external liberalization, but for domestic policy changes as well+ This suggests
that political economy explanations should begin seriously to resituate the study
of domestic institutions and politics in a broader global or at least regional frame-
work+ Finally, this collection of articles allows for some interesting comparisons
of global processes with regional ones+ Two articles—those by Swank and Lee
and Strang—focus exclusively on the OECD countries+ These regional articles are
804 International Organizationquite telling in the context of the broader project+ Swank’s article, for example,
highlights the robustness of competitive pressures, which seem to be at work within
the OECD as well as globally ~as Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons demonstrate!+
The article by Lee and Strang shows that particular ideas account ~asymmetri-
cally! for much policy diffusion+
The goal of this volume is to theorize and test explanations of policy liberaliza-
tion that involve interdependent decision making among governments+ Large clus-
ters of scholarship have tended, in our view, to be too domestic in orientation+ The
interdisciplinary nature of this project has been helpful in this regard+ Not only is
it useful for “political economy” approaches to liberalization to become resituated
in a politically dynamic international economy; it is also useful to understand the
nature of the international setting itself+ Collaboration between political scientists
and sociologists has usefully exposed areas of overlap as well as challenged schol-
ars to think about how to incorporate and test alternative explanations from other
disciplinary traditions+ The articles that follow represent our efforts to understand,
confront, and test explanations that seem promising without undue deference to
disciplinary boundaries+
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